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ROADMAP TO SUCCESS: AN INTERNATIONAL
CONGESTION MANAGEMENT APPROACH TO THE
EUROPEAN UNION TRAFFIC PROBLEM
RYAN M. METZ*
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper elucidates the traffic congestion problem in the
European Union ("EU") and proposes an integrated solution
termed "congestion management." Moreover, it suggests that the
only way congestion management will succeed is through interna-
tional cooperation. The best body for organizing this coopera-
tion and ensuring the success of congestion management is the
EU. Section 2 of this paper defines the traffic congestion prob-
lem, its rapid increase, and the high costs associated with conges-
tion. Section 3 rejects the traditional solution of increasing road
infrastructure and instead proposes and defines congestion man-
agement with both abstract words and concrete examples. In Sec-
tion 4, I explain the drawbacks of maintaining multiple national
plans and the benefits of fashioning a coordinated international
approach. Section 5 lists my proposals for the role the EU should
play in road pricing, technological solutions, and other aspects of
congestion management. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. DEFINING THE PROBLEM AND THE COSTS OF INCREASED
TRAFFIC CONGESTION
As economies grow, as an increasing number of people enter
the workforce with jobs that have international ramifications, as
people move from the centers of cities to the suburbs, as commer-
cial zones are increasingly located further away from residential
zones, and as more people come to rely on their automobiles,
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traffic congestion explodes. Throughout the last two decades,
travel by car has increased exponentially. Estimates of future
growth are grim in light of the inadequate road structure that cur-
rently exists. Traffic congestion affects all countries in the EU
and has large trans-national effects as well. Considering the in-
creasingly international economic structure, experts predict in-
creased international traffic will further exacerbate an already pre-
carious situation where the costs are numerous and extremely
high. The external costs of congestion include time wastage, pol-
lution costs, accident costs, and decreased competitiveness. These
costs escalate in tandem with the congestion problem and will
continue to do so for the foreseeable future.
2.1. Scope of the Road Congestion Problem
Traffic congestion is a phenomenon that is difficult to define.'
One EU Commission defines it as "a recurring phenomenon of
varying duration caused by an imbalance between supply and de-
mand in infrastructure capacity." 2 Congestion spares no Euro-
pean country and the phenomenon affects large cities as well as
small towns? Generally, congestion is not confined to commuter
routes or large cities.4  While it is true that urban, urban-
suburban, and inter-urban traffic vary in amount and effect,' cur-
rent trends in economic development, leisure travel, and interna-
1 See EUROPEAN CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS OF TRANSPORT ("ECMT"),
EUROPEAN TRANSPORT TRENDS AND INFRASTRUCTURAL NEEDS 214 (1995)
[hereinafter EUROPEAN TRANSPORT]. The Transport Ministers primarily at-
tribute this difficulty to variations in traffic over time and differences in the
perceptions of discomforts caused.
2 DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR TRANSPORT, COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TRANS-EUROPEAN NETWORKS: TOWARDS A
MASTER PLAN FOR THE ROAD NETWORK AND ROAD TRAFFIC 73 (1993)
[hereinafter TRANS-EUROPEAN NETWORKS].
3 See id. at 19.
4 Traffic congestion affects work and non-work trips, movement of people,
and the flow of goods. In inter-city corridors, in particular,traffic is disrupted
by accidents, maintenance, detours, and tourists. See ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT ("OECD"), CONGESTION
CONTROL AND DEMAND MANAGEMENT 9 (1994) [hereinafter CONGESTION
CONTROL].
s Urban traffic congestion is recurrent and persistent. Suburban traffic
congestion is limited to certain hours of the day, e.g. rush hour, but is less pre-
dictable than urban traffic. Inter-urban traffic congestion primarily involves
bottlenecks and large jams across popular holiday routes. See EUROPEAN
TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 214.
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tional policy are such that international demand will continue to
grow. In 1986, the European Conference of Ministers of Trans-
port ("ECMT") first commissioned a study which warned of in-
creasing bottlenecks and gridlock and noted that by 1984, "traffic
growth [had] accelerated in all the countries concerned, bringing
rapidly spreading congestion, which [was] no longer limited to
certain links in the network."7
Travel by automobile enjoys a great deal of popularity. To a
large extent, cars have greatly improved our economy and our
lives in general Roads are used for 91% of the movement of per-
sons in Europe and 72% of the movement of goods.9 For medium
or long-distance travel in Europe, 75% is done by car, 14% by rail,
6% by coach, and 5% by air.1 Roads offer people the advantage
of personal transport and best suit the requirements of the current
European market economy for goods. 1 Therefore, planners and
politicians fight not only custom, but also emotion, when they of-
fer solutions aimed at alleviating congestion. For most trips, cars
are the cheapest, most flexible, and most pleasant form of trans-
portation.12 Cars "are fundamental to the Americans' conception
of mobility and personal autonomy," 3 and it is not unreasonable
to say that Europeans also value the freedom of travel by private
automobile. Consider this statement by Yvonne Pepper, an indi-
vidual with a one-hour commute to Amsterdam for work each
morning: "I love the traffic jam. There's happy music on the ra-
dio, and I use the time to take care of my makeup and browse a
bit in the morning paper." 14
Not only have cars enjoyed past popularity, their popularity is
currently expanding exponentially. There are numerous measures
6 See id. at 237.
7 Id. at 23.
1 See DOUGLAS A. HART, STRATEGIC PLANNING IN LONDON 27 (1976)
("The motor car... is not a problem when it is moving; it is a problem when it
stops.") (quoting a speech made in 1963 by Rt. Hon. ErnestMarples, British
Conservative Minister of Transport).
9 See TRANS-EUROPEAN NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 11.
10 See id.
" See id. at 13.
3. See William Underhill, Europe vs. the Car, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 25, 1997, at
34.
13 Charles Komanoff, Pollution Taxes for Roadway Transportation, 12 PACE
ENVTL. L. REv. 121, 123 (1994).
14 Underhill, supra note 12, at 35.
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for ascertaining the extent of the growth of traffic congestion and
trends for determining future growth across Europe. According
to one study, 5,000 out of 54,000 total kilometers of roadway are
congested at any given time, with annual costs of 4 billion Euro-
pean Currency Units ("ECU")"s in 1990, and these costs may
reach ECU 14 billion by 2010.6 Since 1971, travel by car has in-
creased 120%, resulting in the current situation where 75% of all
travel is by car.17 Average speeds in urban areas decreased from 32
kilometers per hour ("km/h") in 1990 to 28 km/h in 1992, 26
km/h in 1994, and are estimated to become as low as 15 km/h by
2010.18 Annual increases during the 1980's in kilometers traveled
by vehicle ranged from 6% in Greece to 16.4% in Portugal1 9 In a
favorable economy, road transport is likely to almost double over
the next twenty years, leading to a 35% growth in the number of
cars, three to five times the number of current bottlenecks, and
subjecting approximately 18% to 30% of Europe's major roads to
severe congestion. 2' The average EU car ownership annual
growth rate is 4%, and some experts estimate that the EU could
reach 0.6 cars per capita within the next few years. 21 Many coun-
tries report an expected increase in traffic demand of over 50% bE
2005,2 with a corresponding increase in road supply of only 6%.
Without any changes to current policy, such increased traffic de-
mand could lead to increases in delays of 400% or more.24
Experts offer many reasons to explain the current growth and
also offer projections for future traffic growth. "[I]ncreased mo-
bility [goes] hand in hand with economic growth." 25 In addition,
" The ECU is the EU's standard monetary unit.
16 See EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
" See Neil Kinnock, Kinnock Speech at Public Transport Conference
(Apr. 23, 1996), available in LEXIS, The Reuter European Community Report.
18 See id.
19 See TRANS-EROPEAN NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 19. The United
Kingdom, for example, had an 11.3% growth rate.
20 See id. at 23-24.
21 See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 117.
22 See id. at 15.
23 See id.
24 See id. at 13.
2s TRANS-EUROPEAN NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 1. This is an effect that
was recognized very early in the rise of the automobile in England. See SIR
JOHN ELLIOT, LONDON TRANSPORT IN 1958 7 (1959) ("Transport can enable a
city to thrive and prosper, [but] traffic can increase because of prosperity to
such an extent that the streets become choked and the city stagnates."). One
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more older people and women are driving." Other factors affect-
ing traffic growth include the following: (1) the spatial diffusion
of human habitat; (2) increases in personal leisure travel; (3) the
spatial redistribution of production and distribution; and (4) huge
underestimates of traffic growth. In particular, growth in per-
sonal car trips for leisure and tourism have increased much more
rapidly than would be estimated by the corresponding growth in
the European Gross Domestic Product ('GDP").28 The European
Commission has attributed the growth of traffic congestion to
reasons such as the following: (1) elasticity of transport vis-a-vis
economic growth; (2) stable energy costs; (3) rise in the number of
vehicles on the road; (4) low-level of public sector investment in
infrastructure; (5) absence of truly competitive means of trans-
port; (6) failures of town planning; and (7) increases in transport
demand.29 Demand increases are due to (1) rises in tourism; (2)
greater length of the average journey; (3) a shift towards rapid
high-service transport; (4) new methods of production and distri-
bution of goods; and (5) failures to internalize costs. 30 These fac-
tors, taken collectively, present major obstacles for the EU. As
Neil Kinnock, the EU's Head Minister of Transport stated,
"[T]he economic costs and the danger potential of such condi-
tions... squash [] the meaning out of 'mobility' or 'freedom of
movement."'3 1 Europe's traffic problems are clearly tremendous
and their causes are varied and numerous.
startling example of the link between prosperity and traffic growth is in the Far
East, where economic growth has spurred a 20% per year increase in conges-
tion, compared to a 5% per year growth in traffic in the rest of the developed
world. See Neil Thapar, There's Jam in Those Jams, MAIL ON SUNDAY (Lon-
don), June 23, 1996, at 11.
26 See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 118. Every 1% shift in the
female population from non-driver to driver leads to almost a 10 billion mile
increase in miles traveled per year in the United States. See id.
Other small changes can have profound impacts upon traffic. Current wave
and chaos theories suggest that small waves, curves, and braking lead to most
traffic problems. See John Harlow, Chaos Theory Offers a Route out of Our
Clogged Roads, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Aug. 7, 1994, at 7.
27 See EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 31.
28 See id. at 42. Seventy-five percent of all international trips are for leisure.
See id. As many as 50 million travelers per year arrive in France, Italy, and
Spain, and 10 to 20 million arrive in the United Kingdom, Portugal, Switzer-
land, and Greece annually. See id. (citing OECD statistics).
29 See Trans-EUROPEAN NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 21.
30 See id.
31 Kinnock, supra note 17.
1998]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
2.2. Rise of International Traffic in Europe
One area of concern for the EU is the growth in international
traffic and the increasingly international effects created by a rise
in traffic congestion. International traffic is the most dynamic
traffic component.3 2 "[T]he proportion of international traffic on
some links is already quite large[,] it is by no means negligible[,]
and [it is] continuing to increase on national networks as a
whole."33 International traffic always increases at a greater pace
than national traffic;34 it may increase by a multiple of seven to
eight in some countries," while domestic traffic may increase only
one percent. 6 These huge estimates result largely from lifestyle
changes and frontiers being dismantled, which will likely stimu-
late economies and implicate traffic growth. The growth has been
attributed to several factors including the following: (1) more
money in booming economies leading to more cars; (2) the open-
ing of Southern Europe to the European Economic Community
with Spain and Portugal joining; (3) the opening of Eastern
Europe with the fall of communist dictatorships; and (4) an in-
creasingly global approach to trade.37 Growing demands in road
freight transport38 promote international traffic since freight
transport serves as "the backbone of our free-market economy."39
As companies become more internationally focused, especially in
light of the push towards an open market in the EU, they will in-
evitably conflict with an aging, under-planned, and inadequate in-
frastructure.
32 See EUROPEAN TRANsPORT, supra note 1, at 9. Annual international
road traffic increased by more than 12% during the second half of the 1980s.
See id. at 38.
33 Id. at 13.
34 See id. at 34.
31 See id. at 10. Percentages of total international traffic range from the
low-end of 20% or less in Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, and
Greece to the high-end in small seaboard countries, such as 56.3% in The Neth-
erlands and 61.2% in Belgium. See id. at 38.
36 See id. at 10.
37 See id. at 26.
38 Freight transport has increased by 50% in the EU since 1974. See
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2.3. Economic and Social Costs of Increased Traffic Congestion
The costs of traffic congestion in terms of wasted time and
fuel consumption are quite high.4" Not only do motor vehicles
play a central role in economic activity as the primary source of
transportation, but they also are a major source of dis-benefits
such as pollution (air and noise), accidents, and congestion.4"
Time wastage costs42 in fifty urban areas in the United States, cal-
culated by the difference between actual journey time and the
maximum possible journey time in free-flowing traffic, were es-
timated43 at $780 million in 1989 (including additional fuel costs
due to lower speeds) and $700 million in 1988.' The Environ-
ment Green Book of the Commission of the European Commu-
nities (1992) reported that congestion costs in the United King-
dom ranged from 10 to 15 billion pounds (ECU 12.5 to 19
billion) per year.4" These time wastage costs are far from trivial;
in the United States 1.3% of the Gross National Product ("GNP")
is attributable to time wastage costs, in France they constitute
2.1% of the GNP, and in the United Kingdom they are 3.2% of
the GNP.46 Furthermore, the costs are not simply due to wasted
time. Gridlock has other deleterious effects such as decreased
quality of life, a diminished environment, and decreased industrial
40 See Kenneth Button, Overview of Internalising the Social Costs of Trans-
port, in INTERNALISING THE SOCIAL COSTS OF TRANSPORT 7, 18 (1994) [here-
inafter INTeRNALISING]; see also Thapar, supra note 25 (noting that billions of
pounds are lost each year due to snarf-ups and delays).
41 See Komanoff, supra note 13, at 123.
42 "Traffic congestion steals time and equanimity from drivers, passengers
and from non-motorists caught in gridlock." Id. at 124-25.
41 Obviously, none of the costs discussed in this paper can actually be val-
ued with an exact figure. Traffic has local effects (noise and vibration),trans-
boundary effects (acid rain), and global effects (greenhouse gases). See Button,
supra note 40, at 15. The OECD identifies four valuation methods. First,
"precedents" looks at legal judgments and payments to workers for working in
congested or environmentally-poor conditions. Second, "averting behavior"
assesses the costs of insulating or altering behaviors. Third, "revealed prefer-
ence" examines actual trade-offs made for environmental reasons in a secondary
market, such as housing. Finally, "stated preference" or "contingency valua-
tion" investigates market actors' preferences by conducting research through
the use of hypotheticals. See id. at 17-18. See generally tmile Quinet, The Social
Costs of Transport: Evaluation and Links with Internalisation Policies, in
INTERNALISING, supra note 40, at 31.
41 See Quinet, supra note 43, at 52.
" See id. at 53.
46 See id.
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competitiveness." In the United States, costs to society- includ-
ing accidents, injuries, and loss of life- and to the environment
are said to run upwards of several hundred billion dollars annu-
ally, and could be as great as $700 billion, or one-eighth of the
GDP of the United States.48
2.3.1. The External Nature of the Traffic-Related Costs
Most costs associated with traffic are external.49 Externalities
are the costs or benefits associated with a transaction which are
usually not accounted for by the parties to the transaction because
they fall on third parties." There are very few externalized bene-
fits of transport, because market actors generally have incentives
to internalize the benefits associated with transport, while they
lack similar incentives to internalize its costs."' External costs and
benefits are often ignored when prices are set in a market. In the
transport industry, in particular, governments often compound
the problem by implementing policies which discourage efficient
functioning of the transport market.5 2 Recent trends in both po-
litical and economic realms preach the elimination of external-
ities, accompanied by internalization of most, if not all, costs as-
sociated with a transaction, 3 including those costs associated with
transportation interactions. 4
47 See TRANS-EUROPEAN NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 1-2.
Transportation is important for the efficient delivery of many economic
goods and services, and it is also an important economic activity in and of itself.
See ECMT, in INTERNALISING, supra note 40, at 3. High costs could negatively
impact upon the motor vehicle industry which accounts, directly or indirectly,
for one of every ten jobs in the European Community. See TRANS-EUROPEAN
NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 2.
48 See Komanoff, supra note 13, at 125. A majority of these costs are not
internalized. Komanoff argues for efficiency and measures to force travelers to
pay. See id. at 125-26; see also infra Section 2.3.
49 For a discussion of the useful terms, policy, and concepts of externalities,
see Button, supra note 40, at 8-13.
10 See RYAN C. AMACHER & HOLLEY H. ULBRICH, PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMICS glossary at 5 (5th ed. 1992); id. at 10.
11 An example of an external benefit would be if a market actor watched
traffic in order to view sports cars, from which act he derived some intangible
benefit such as joy or awe, but derived no real monetary benefit. See Button,
supra note 40, at 10.
52 See ECMT, supra note 47, at 3.
s Internalization requires that all parties affected by a transaction consider
all benefits and costs associated with the transaction when bargaining over the
fair price. See Button, supra note 40, at 13. Though it would foster an efficient
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In the transport context, the externalities of traffic congestion
pose the greatest costs for other users of the same mode of trans-
portation. Even though this understanding implies that costs are
somewhat internalised by motorists as a group, the marginal costs
created by each additional motorist who enters a congested
motorway are "in principle" externalized, because the individual
motorist does not bear all the costs of the additional congestion."5
2.3.2. Types of Costs Associated with Traffic Congestion
There are many types of internal and external costs associated
with motor vehicles. Out-of-pocket costs for gas and insurance-
estimated in 1990 to be at about $3,600 per car per year in the
United States- are internalized. 6 American experts value "tax-
payer costs" at $20 to $30 billion dollars; these amounts are de-
rived from government spending figures for road-building and
maintenance." "Social costs," borne by neither drivers nor the
government, total $726 billion; 8 $168 billion of these costs are
congestion-related, 9 of which $25 billion is borne by the public.
6
Other social costs include accidents and casualties ($319 billion
dollars per year in the United States), pollution and noise ($94 bil-
allocation of resources, strict internalization is too harsh because parties would
be forced to bargain constantly. Therefore, those who espouse government ef-
forts to force internalization often wish to achieve only quasi-optimal levels,
and thus aim for "quasi-internalization" through the use of Pigouvian taxes and
subsidies. See generally A. C. PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).
By the imposition of such taxes and subsidies, the government attempts to in-
duce economically optimal behavior. See Button, supra note 40, at 14. Coase
wrote of the assumptions required to reach the highest levels of internalization
and optimality. See generally Robert H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
4 The "[r]apid growth in the volume and complexity of transportation
services in recent years ... has significantly heightened political interest in the
problem of transport externalities." ECMT, supra note 47, at 3.
" See Per Kageson, Effects of Internalisation on Transport Demand and Mo-
dal Split, in INTERNALISING, supra note 40, at 77,77-78.
56 See Komanoff, supra note 13, at 126-27.
1 See id. at 127.
58 These data are contained in Table 1 of Komanoff's article. See id. at 128,
tbl.1.
" Congestion-related costs represent motorists' lost time as well as higher
shipping costs. See id. at 129.
60 See id at 128 tbl. 1. Of the total congestion costs to the public, 15% is
borne by non-motorists in the form of lost time. All congestion costs are im-
posed by drivers on someone else. See id. at 129.
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lion), land-associated costs ($65 billion), and energy costs ($60 bil-
lion)." Each of these external costs obviously adds billions to a
growing problem.
The costs in Europe vary in value somewhat, but citizens of
both Europe and the United States are similarly reliant on their
cars as a means of transportation. Cars, roadways, and their ef-
fects are significantly comparable for determining the distribution
of costs. 2 For example, accident costs63 are 1.24% of the GNP in
the United States and the mean for Europe is 1.25%. 6" Addition-
ally, lost time is a relevant cost in the United States and Europe
alike. One London study found that each driver on the road costs
all others about fifty cents per kilometer.5
External environmental costs cross boundaries to become a
global problem. For example, pollution has major economic costs
associated with it. tmile Quinet details values for the local pollu-
tion CoStS 66 of automobile transportation at levels which range
61 See id. at 129-31.
62 See generally CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4; Underhill, supra
note 12, at 34-35 (comparing the gridlock and pollution effects of Europe and
America).
63 These costs include the number of dead and injured, as well as material
damage costs. See Quinet, supra note 43, at 35.
4 Values range from 0.47% in Norway to 1.92% in Finland. See id. at 37
tbls. 2.2-2.3.
65 See Clay Fong, Taking It to the Streets: Western European and American
Sustainable Transportation Policy and the Prospects for Community Level Change,
7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 463, 465-66 (1996).
66 These costs include damage to human health, physical materials, and
plant life caused by sulfides, nitrous-oxides, and other particles (excepting car-
bon dioxide which is a global matter). See Quinet, supra note 43, at 43; see also
Komanoff, supra note 13, at 124 (listing combustion of fuel (which pollutes the
air and accelerates global warming), petroleum extraction (which damages hu-
man and animal habitats), and noise which creates stress and disrupts daily life)
among the detrimental environmental effects of automobiles in the United
States).
This Comment does not focus on the damage done to the environment, but
rather looks generally at the economic costs of increased congestion. However,
one cannot deny the particular importance of actual environmental damage,
especially in the political arena. Seventy-one percent of United Kingdom resi-
dents see pollution as the greatest problem of road traffic. See Leyla Boulton &
Gillian Tett, Race on to Clear the Air: Drivers Must Be Persuaded to Use Their
Cars Less, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 5, 1996, at 12. It cannot be denied that"a
race is on to find technology that can clean up emissions before a build-up in
traffic increases the amount of air pollution." Id. This may lead one to the
conclusion that "no measure for congestion management will be considered in
the future which has more negative efTects on the environment. .. . However,
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from 0.19% to 1.05% of the GNP of several European countries."
Moreover, roads constitute a primary source of pollution as they
rend landscape, create noise, and add to run-off problems.68 Also,
10,000 deaths per year in the United Kingdom are attributable to
respiratory problems contributed to by vehicles.69 Global pollu-
tion costs, which account for costs associated with carbon dioxide
and greenhouse gases, have significant yet undetermined economic
effects.' Scientists estimate that 21% of all carbon dioxide omis-
sions are related to congestion in OECD countries." The local,
national, and global nature of the huge and growing costs of traf-
fic congestion make it necessary to develop an integrated plan.
2.4. Conclusion on the Scope and Costs of Traffic Congestion
Cars continue to enjoy great popularity and clog the roads of
Europe. As the European economy flourishes, the growth in traf-
fic congestion is forecasted to increase more rapidly. A large
component of increased traffic in Europe results from interna-
tional travel. Each additional car on the road, regardless of its
positive effects of measures on the environment.., could constitute an impor-
tant argument for implementing measures (possibly more important than ar-
guments like improved efficiency or congestion management)." See
CONGESION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 121. Therefore, policies such as cre-
ating and/or improving underground mass transit capacity, which typically are
championed "for reasons of noise [avoidance] and appearance, much more than
for reasons of local pollution," and where levels of overall pollution are"gener-
ally neglected," can be publicly justified by environmental protection ration-
ales. See Quinet, supra note 43, at 60.
67 See Quinet, supra note 43, at 44 tbl. 2.7.
68 See the illustration entitled "The Influence of Road and Traffic on the
Environment" provided in TRANS-EUROPEAN NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 93-
95. See Komanoff, supra note 13, at 124 (stating that "larger, wider, faster"
roads overrun communities, trash landscapes, and destroy the wilderness in the
United States).
69 See Boulton & Tett, supra note 66, at 12.
o See Quinet, supra note 43, at 47-51; see also Fong, supra note 65, at 464
("The production of... air pollutants by cars and trucks is a source of global
concern.").
There are many estimates of the degree of heating of the earth and its ef-
fects. See generally WILLIAM R. CLINE, OECD, GLOBAL WARMING: THE
BENEFITS OF EMISSION ABATEMENT (1992). The most significant problem re-
lated to global warming costs is that the "extent to which the greenhouse effect
has so far been internalized is virtually zero .... " See Quinet, supra note 43, at
60. However, imposing taxes to pay for global warming costs would encourage
significant free-rider problems. See id. at 63.
1 See Quinet, supra note 43, at 51.
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origin or destination, adds huge external costs to an overloaded
system. These costs are economic, social, and environmental in
nature. Unless Europe controls its congestion problem, traffic-
related costs will continue to grow exponentially.
3. SOLUTIONS TO THE TRAFFIC CONGESTION DILEMMA
Although early automobile designers and urban planners
probably could not have foreseen the profound effects traffic
would have upon the landscapes of many nations, they recognized
that traffic congestion needed to be addressed. Planners typically
relied upon building more roads in order to alleviate the pressure
of rising traffic. Growing populations, environmental concerns,
and high costs have forced governments to look into new solu-
tions. "Congestion management" policy seeks to package these
new solutions in an integrated manner, so as to most effectively
deal with traffic problems. In part, congestion management ad-
dresses the problems of external costs by forcing internalization.
In addition, congestion management strives for new technological
solutions. Other regulatory aspects of traffic management play
key roles in helping to manage the congestion quandary.
3.1. The Traditional Solution: Increasing Road Infrastructure
During the rise of the automobile, many countries dealt with
the problem of increased traffic and corigestion by increasing the
number of roads and adding to their current road infrastructure.
Transport planners traditionally built more roads to accommo-
date more automobiles and to meet the mobility needs of growing
populations in Europe and the United States. 2 In urban England,
"[t]he belief that road building was an essential component in
preventing ultimate traffic strangulation seemed to most observers
to be axiomatic."73 Early planners believed that demand for roads
could not be effectively reduced; therefore, they believed the only
viable solution was to increase road capacity.74 The unfortunate
result is a road pattern resembling a "complex, irregular cobweb,"
where the patterns date back to the Middle Ages." Today, in-
' See Fong, supra note 65, at 463 & n.1.
73 HART, supra note 8, at 29.
74 See id. at 34.
7 Some of the most important routes have origins in the Roman Empire.
See id. at 42. Unfortunately, even in communities that are relativelyyoung in
the United States, planners have adopted the nightmarish approach of continu-
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vestment in road infrastructure is generally aimed at either pro-
viding links to the European area as a whole, by completing pe-
ripheral area "missing links,""6 or increasing capacity on roads
where links already exist.' There are a number of drawbacks to
increasing road infrastructure." Infrastructural augmentation has
a huge "lead time"- time between the first proposal and its effec-
tive date- which is rarely shorter than ten years.7 9 It also re-
quires huge commitments of funds, which currently are more
scarce than they were a quarter of a century ago, despite the grow-
ing need for such financing.80
3.2. A New Approach: The Congestion Management Method
Paucity' of funds, lack of space, environmental concerns, pub-
lic opinion,"1 and the recognition that traffic congestion and its as-
sociated costs are increasing more rapidly has led officials to con-
ally adding infrastructure. See John Dorschner, Road to Ruin When All the
Highway Construction Is Finally Over, We Will Have Built Ourselves One Big
Traffic Jam, MIAMI HERALD, July 10, 1988, at Tropic-8.
76 Peripheral areas are those regions such as the United Kingdom, the Ibe-
rian Peninsula, and countries bordering on the East, which generally have
lesser- developed infrastructures. See EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at
16.
' Development of increased road capacity usually involves either con-
structing alternatives to avoid large cities or simply increasing the number of
lanes. However, the ECMT urges an "intermoda" plan involving both land,
sea, and air transport. See id, at 17. This paper focuses on solutions aimed at
land transport by car specifically, but recognizes that a large part of the solution
may be derived from other transportation modes.
78 See Kinnock, supra note 17 (noting that major expansion is economically
unaffordable and environmentally undesirable).
71 See EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 32 (attributing the time lag
largely to politicking and necessary budgetary trade-offs).
80 See Robert Caruth, UK: Road Plan Scaled Down -Major Cost Cut - Coun-
cil Gives Backing to Cheaper Single Carriageway, W. MORNING NEWS, Mar. 6,
1997 ("The amount of money made available fornew road schemes has fallen
dramatically in recent years and the sum is unlikely to increase in the near fu-
ture.") (quoting a statement made by Brian Greenblade, Member of British Par-
liament); see also EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 32-33 (Providing ex-
planations and graphs).
81 For example, in the United Kingdom, there is increasing public resis-
tance to new roadwork due to inadequate environmental-impact studies. Public
opinion is also against road expansion in Germany and The Netherlands. In
France, space has-been reserved for increasing infrastructure, but budgetary lim-
its have constrained development. There are similar restraints in the United
States. See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 120-21.
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sider alternatives to increasing road infrastructure. 2 Many Euro-
pean countries have examined hundreds of alternatives, some of
the most promising of which are discussed below. Traffic minis-
tries have attempted to integrate many of the proposed solutions
by developing a policy on "congestion management." The
OECD defines "congestion management" as "the application of
administrative, economic, operations, and technological measures
aimed at making the most efficient use of existing transport infra-
structure, modes, and services."
83
Countries have examined demand-side and supply-side reme-
dies aimed at improving the operating efficiency of the existing
transport system. Demand-side policies look at ways of encourag-
ing individuals to use other forms of transportation and discour-
aging them from traditional road travel by automobile. Supply-
side methods include increasing infrastructure, a policy which is
generally disfavored by congestion management, and increasing
access to alternative forms of transport. Congestion management
techniques favor demand-side methods, but often work in concert
with other methods.8 4 For example, traffic ministries hope to de-
crease demand for roads by reducing the need for and length of
car trips, promoting the use of non-motorized or public transport,
promoting carpooling, shifting work away from peak hours or
peak roads, and ultimately reducing traffic delays.8 5 There are
many methods utilized, including land use policy, alternative
work schedules, working from home, telecommuting, road pric-
ing, traffic signal improvements, preferential treatment for buses
or carpools, and route guidance systems.8 6
A policy related to congestion management is sustainability.
"A sustainable society stands for developments which satisfy the
82 "Given the growing body of evidence to show that traffic congestion
problems cannot be solved simply by expanding the road infrastructure alone,
many countries are trying to manage their existing transport systems in order
to enhance... traffic fluidity." Id. at 9-10.
83 Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
84 Supply-side and demand-side approaches often act in concert. For exam-
ple, providing a bus lane reduces car demand and increases public transit supply.
See i. at 16.
85 See id.
86 See id. at 19-20. These measures are alternately effective in urban and in-
ter-urban areas, during peak and off-peak times, in areas where traffic is con-





needs of the present society without endangering the possibilities
for future generations to satisfy their needs as well.""7 Addressing
increasing traffic congestion solely by increasing infrastructure is
detrimental to future generations. A sustainable approach to traf-
fic recognizes that congestion is not an isolated problem.8
Sustainability requires lower energy consumption, lower costs,
and compatibility with sustainable land policies and ways of liv-
ing.89 A sustainable approach to transport policy would assess ur-
ban planning and zoning, mass transit, alternative transportation
networks, and regulations which attempt to better capture the ex-
ternal costs of driving.9" These ideals are consistent with conges-
tion management and are often incorporated into plans proposed
by congestion managers.
3.2.1. Congestion Management Solutions
Congestion management attempts to integrate as many aspects
of traffic policy as possible. The solutions included in a successful
congestion management policy will be numerous. Two compo-
nents that a proficient congestion management approach must in-
clude are road-pricing and technological solutions. Additionally,
there are many policy aspects that a congestion management pol-
icy could include (e.g., land use and zoning, administrative restric-
tions on and incentives to travel, and increased public transporta-
tion) which are beyond the scope of this paper. However, these
other aspects are important, and I mention them briefly below to
aid in the discussion of an integrated policy at the EU level.
3.2.1.1. Congestion Management Example P Road Pricing
Congestion management must address the external costs of
traffic congestion. Congestion management attempts to reduce
the costs of traffic congestion as much as possible; therefore, it fol-
lows that individuals should pay their full share of costs. This
" Id. at 128. Kinnock, the EU's Head Minister of Transport, has expanded
on this definition, arguing that sustainability is "[t]he safe, efficient, environ-
mentally reasonable movement of people and goods at reasonable cost and with
dependable access and choice." Kinnock, supra note 17.
88 See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 128.
89 See Fred A. Reid, Real Possibilities in the Transportation Myths, in
SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES 167, 187 (Sim Van der Ryn & Peter Calthorpe
eds., 1986).
" See Fong, supra note 65, at 467-68.
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idea is gaining broader support. It is not only the view of econo-
mists, but at the political level, it is also a goal. 1 Reduction of the
large external costs' requires introducing simple, private rules of
pricing and allocation.93 Although internalization does not elimi-
nate environmental and congestion costs, congestion charges
could optimize such costs. 94 Congestion pricing is "a user charge
to the motorist that accounts for costs imposed on all motorists as
a result of the additional delay caused by that motorist's entry and
movement through the traffic stream."95 It entails assessing vehi-
cles for the congestion they cause and the time losses they impose
on other road users, then using one of various methods of incen-
tives or penalties to encourage more efficient road usage.96 Con-
gestion charges do not include the motorway tolls exacted by
countries like France, Italy, and Spain: tolls motivated primarily
by revenue-raising considerations. Instead, congestion charges
are plans that have traffic restraint and road-funding as their pri-
mary objectives."
Congestion charges can be used effectively "[t]o reduce traffic
loads, and indirectly, traffic emissions." 99 Evidence of the ability
of financial incentives to cause shifts in traffic patterns is quite
persuasive."0 Despite this evidence, there are still few detailed
congestion-pricing programs because of the costs of implementa-
9' See Arie Bleijenberg, The Art of Internalising, in INTERNALISING, supra
note 40, at 95, 95. For example, the Dutch government made road pricing"a
key element of its traffic policy." Id.
92 See discussion infra Section 2.3.1.
9' See generally Werner Rothengatter, Obstacles to the Use of Economic In-
struments in Transport Policy, in INTERNALISING, supra note 40, at 113.
94 See Button, supra note 40, at 12.
" See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 38.
96 See Komanoff, supra note 13, at 131. Congestion pricing would reduce
aggregate losses and also defray the costs of expanding roads if that became nec-
essary. To properly account for the costs imposed by a driver, congestion pric-
ing would vary with the amount of congestion on the roads during peak and
off-peak hours. See id. at 131-32.
"' See Quinet, supra note 43, at 64.
98 See id. at 65 tbl.2.15 (listing 11 cities or areas studying and/or utilizing
road pricing).
99 Kageson, supra note 55, at 78.
100 In the United States, financial incentives led to an intended 8-18% re-
duction in vehicle trips in certain areas, and when combined with disincentives,
vehicle trips can likely be reduced by nearly 50%. In traffic-choked Singapore,
congestion-pricing has created a 23% trip reduction over the past four years.
See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 4142.
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tion and political opposition." 1 Other economic measures used
or considered include parking pricing, 2 transportation allow-
ances, public transit and rideshare incentives, transport-pass pro-
grams, 0' and other incentives given to employers who encourage
anything that reduces traffic congestion."° Penalties include smog
fees,"'5 higher gasoline taxes, 106 and other fees and fines.107
Pollution taxes and charges have secondary benefits. The dol-
lars collected can be recycled and used to lower taxes; therefore, a
tax on a harm would effectively displace a tax on a good.10 8 This
aspect of the taxation can help garner public support for the taxa-
tion. In the United Kingdom, for example, support for conges-
tion pricing- though remaining relatively low- rose dramati-
cally when the money was earmarked specifically for improving
public transport, rather than for a general fund. 9 A double-
benefit could arise from this because cars would be both cheaper
101 See id. at 39.
102 In Rome, for example, parking is free, and its citizens feel it should be
this way by natural right. See Underhill, supra note 12, at 35. But, parking
pricing includes more than simply paying to park. There are surcharges for
peak-period parking and statutes which force employers to charge for parking
in private lots. In California, strict parking regulations go into effect when air
quality is exceptionally poor. See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 38-
40.
103 Public transport passes can be bought by employers and sold to em-
ployees. Programs may also include travel-allowance payments and carpool
subsidies. See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 40.
104 For example, in Norway, permits are issued to denote which cars can
travel to which cities during specified times. A similar method is used in Milan:
peak-period entry restrictions. See id. at 39.
105 Smog fees charge money per mile based upon an estimate of the pollut-
ant driver's damage done to health, buildings, roads, and visibility. This charge
is based upon the notion that polluters should compensate for any damage they
cause. The plan would also require rating each vehicle for its polluting propen-
sity. See Komanoff, supra note 13, at 136-37.
1C6 Europe is generally less reluctant to charge high gasoline taxes than the
United States. The highest gasoline taxes in 1993 were in place in the New
York/New Jersey/Connecticut tri-state area, at $0.34 per gallon. Most Euro-
pean taxes ranged from $1.75 to $2.75, and they topped off at $3.75 in Italy. See
id. at 142.
107 One commentator has estimated that, in the United States, unallocated
costs derived from human behavior total $44 billion. Thus, with 170 million
drivers, each driver should owe approximately $260 per year in fines. See id. at
145. Other taxes could be leviea against freight transport, but that subject is
not addressed in this paper. See generally Kageson, supra note 55.
108 See Komanoff, supra note 13, at 156.
109 See id. at 134.
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and fewer (benefiting the public), while expenditures on leisure,
personal expenses, and public transport would increase (benefiting
the individual).11° Congestion pricing is superior to High Occu-
pancy Vehicle ("HOV") lanes or other preference-type systems
that offer only time savings through ride-sharing, because conges-tion pricing encourages ride-sharing and offers money savings-
Critics recognize many problems with road pricing. Some
worry that increased transport costs could have detrimental ef-
fects on the poor and could cause unemployment," but the
ECMT argues that if the extra revenue raised is used effectively,
employment may actually rise despite the elimination of a road
subsidy. 13 In addition, implementing road pricing could have
enormous administrative costs. Although no comprehensive cost-
benefit analysis has been done, rough estimates in the United
States show that $80 billion can be raised, with $70 billion in
costs, thus netting $10 billion in gains. When compared to the
situation in 1981, where $40 billion in costs were associated with
transport, but only $22 billion had been collected, the "high"
costs do not appear quite so insurmountable. 4 Other potential
problems for road-pricing include resistance to its popular accep-
tance and employer participation, difficulties associated with ac-
curate valuation and pricing, and avoiding discrimination towards
poor and/or urban drivers.
11 See Bleijenberg, supra note 91, at 101.
11 This is effective because the greater the number of people sharing costs,
the greater the reduction in costs per individual. See Komanoff, supra note 13,
at 135.
112 The argument is buttressed by claims that taxes on vehicles and their
usage will discourage their purchase but not their use. See TRANS-EUROPEAN
NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 75. The concern exists that such a trend could
threaten new car demand to the point where the automobile industry would
possibly collapse. Fortunately, this scenario seems unlikely considering the
current reliance of Europeans on their cars and the opening of jobs in other sec-
tors of the transportation industry, such as public transit and telematics.
113 See Bleijenberg, supra note 91, at 101. This notion is based upon the
remise that more expensive transport will lead to decreasing turnover of some
branches of industry.
114 In the United States, costs of congestion pricing were estimated to range
between $0.24 and $13.52 per trip, but the OECD believed such costs would
easily be offset by parking revenues and avoidance of other costs. See
CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 42.
"' See id. at 43; see also Quinet, supra note 43, at 62 (listing the defects of
taxes, including uncertainty in determining environmental effects, psychologi-
cal opposition, and undesirable redistributive effects).
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Another caveat that must be considered is well articulated by
Jeremy Vanke, the Policy Chief of the Royal Auto Club of Eng-
land. Vanke suggests that "[t]he only way to make road pricing
acceptable is to have alternatives available."116 Economic instru-
ments and regulatory measures are simply two factors in a com-
prehensive strategy that must also include technological solutions,
regional planning, and efficient public transport.117 Congestion
pricing relies upon the development and implementation of an
automated toll system, and therefore toll plaza bottlenecks are
completely eliminated.'
3.2.1.2. Congestion Management Example Ih
Intelligent Transport Systems and Telematics
Automated toll systems are just one part of a cutting-edge,
rapidly-developing traffic management solution called intelligent
transport systems ("ITS"). Congestion management must include
ITS as another component. Congestion management looks to
control traffic through as many means as possible and is particu-
larly demanding of investment in the future. This investment in-
cludes purchasing the state-of-the-art technology that constitutes
ITS. ITS have "interactive applications to monitor traffic," give
feedback to avoid jams, detail length of jams, give optimal driving
speeds, and give alternate route options."" Components of ITS
can include the following: (1) computerized traffic signals which
adjust for traffic volume; (2) changeable message signs; (3) elec-
tronic toll systems; (4) radio data systems which measure volume
and relay it to a traffic control center, where the information can
be relayed to in-car electronic maps or message signs (currently
operating in southeast England and available in France, Germany,
116 Boulton & Tett, supra note 66, at 12.
117 See European Commission, Resolution on the Commission Green Paper
in The Citizens' Network" Fulfilling the Potential of Public Passenger Transport in
Europe, Bulletin of the European Union, Supp. 4/95, at 11-17 [hereinafter Reso-
lution on the Green Paper]; see also discussion infra Section 3.2.1.
" See Komanoff, supra note 13, at 134, 158. This development would
yield a tremendous side benefit. See Robert Key Visits First British Demonstra-
tion of City Congestion-Charging Technology in Cambridge, Hermes-UK Press
Releases, Reuter Textline, Oct. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS (describing the
technology of automated tolls, where cards in vehicles allow tolls to automati-
cally be deducted as vehicles pass through, and video cameras are used to record
non-payers).
19 CRRI to Develop ITS for Asia Pacific Region, BUS. STANDARD, Oct. 25,
1996, at 4.
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and Sweden);2 ' and (5) global- positioning systems which locate
cars, give maps, unlock doors, and shut down stolen cars."' ITS
components, plus "intelligent cars" which can send and receive
information and perhaps drive themselves, comprise "telematics,"
a rapidly growing field encompassing the technologies of electron-
ics, computing, and communications. 22
Together, telematics and ITS could potentially double the ca-
pacity of existing highways as the pieces of the necessary technol-
ogy fall into place."2 Recently, a stunning demonstration of intel-
ligent vehicle highway systems ("IVHS") in San Diego,
California, showed how magnetic spikes in the road can keep cars
moving in platoons traveling together at high speeds. The project
is being carried-out by the U.S. National Automated Highway
System Consortium, which is a group of corporations, universi-
ties, and government agencies attempting to meet the goal of 1991
federal legislation that aimed for the economic and technical fea-
sibility of automated vehicles by 2002."2 A similar project involv-
ing fourteen car manufacturers and fifty research institutes is un-
derway in Europe and receives some EU support. 12  One major
stumbling block to implementing IVHS is that the technology is
only highly efficient when the infrastructure is widely available
120 One of the most developed data collection systems is "Autoguide" in
London which inundates travelers on roads, trains, and buses with up-to-date
information on traffic congestion. There are problems, however, as divers are
often reluctant to even pay attention to the information, let alone heed its sug-
gestions to take alternate routes. See TRANS-EUROPEAN NETWORKS, supra
note 2, at 85.
121 Johanna Powell, Technology Steers Cars on Safe Paths, FIN. POST, Aug.
10, 1996, at 4-5.
"2 See 'Intelligent' Systems Provide $15 Bn Bag of Opportunities, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 1997, at 7 [hereinafter Intelligent Systems].
123 Conventional highways carry 2000 vehicles per hour per lane, which is
too many to be obeying the two second rule" for safety. Automated vehicles
travel one half second apart and have 36004000 vehicles per hour per lane, ac-
cording to Colin Rayman, Manager of Ontario (Canada) Ministry of Transpor-
tation, ITS Office. See Powell, supra note 121, at 4.
114 Au oosition has been made that in North America, the progess of
automatedvehicles has been stifled by societal issues of trust, liability, and pri-
vacy, rather than technology. See id. Cf Sheri A. Alpert, Privacy and Intelli-
gent Highways: Finding the Right of Way, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 97, 97-104 (giving an overview of Intelligent Vehicle Highway
Systems and possible intrusions into privacy).
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and can be fully integrated into a complete system 26 It should be
recognized that telematics cannot be the only answer. The U.S.
and European experts agree that while outfitting all highways
with ITS technology could increase capacity by one-third by
2005, congestion is estimated to double by that time. " These fac-
tors as well as reluctance to commit public funding to implemen-
tation have been the principal factors behind the slow growth of
ITS.
3.2.1.3. Other Solutions of Integrated Congestion
Management Policies
The other aspects of congestion management that should be
mentioned include public transit, land use policy, and administra-
tive measures. One of the major goals of congestion management
is to find alternative modes of transport to private automobile
use, i.e., trains, street cars, buses, ferries, and even helicopters.
Unfortunately, "[n]o other mode is in any position to replace
road transport on a large scale. . 128 When choosing a mode of
transport, a consumer normally considers the following: (1) the
availability and comprehensibility of information available about
the mode; (2) conditions of access such as necessity of a license or
passport; (3) level of service, including comfort, safety, travel
time, reliability and waiting time; and (4) costs of the journey."9
Traffic Policy Managers can manipulate these factors in such a
way as to alter choices. However, even a 50% increase in the use
of an alternative passenger-transport mode is likely to lead to only
a minor percentage decrease in road traffic, which would proba-
bly not keep pace with the annual growth rate in road traffic. 3
Land-use and zoning law is another policy alternative used to
reduce congestion. It attempts to provide a framework for
growth in an area by promoting environmental protection, public
126 See Intelligent Systems, supra note 122, at 7. However, there are tech-
nologies which do not require government involvement, such as the following:
navigation, route guidance, CD-ROM, fax, Internet, collision-avoidance sys-
tems, and driver-alertness monitors. See id.
127 See id.
128 TRANS-EUROPEAN NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 74.
129 See EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note.1, at 24.
131 See TRANS-EURoPEAN NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 75. The Commis-
sion also quotes a study which predicts that only a 7% decrease in traffic would
result from a 50% increase in rail ridership in Germany. See id. at 75.
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safety, and the general welfare."' Urban planners examine pat-
terns of land use and site design of neighborhoods to determine
the most effective way to influence a person's mode choice.
132
Several effective zoning policies exist, such as the following: (1)
developing "neighborhood commercial districts" (living in the
community where one works); (2) encouraging development of
recreational, employment, and retail land uses near homes; 133 (3)
encouraging public transport-compatible development on vacant
parcels; (4) discouraging auto-oriented land uses such as parking
lots; (5) increasing residential density along existing public transit
routes; and, (6) planning pedestrian and bicycle access and priori-
ties.13 All of these initiatives require governmental and institu-
tional involvement to be implemented effectively. Several coun-
tries have tried land-use policies with varying degrees of success,
but there is little uniformity.13
One planning measure, telecommuting, completely eliminates
the need for travel to work. Telecommuting is the substitution of
telecommunications for the daily commute.13 6 Teleconferencing,
teleshoping, and "cyber" services can reduce car trips even
more. 13  Still, there are limits to the effectiveness of these meas-
ures. Nations must rely on employers to implement these
changes, despite the fact that employers have little incentive to do
so now. 13' Also, the effects of telecommuting on traffic are cur-
rently questionable, because most employees will still have their
131 See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 25-26.
132 For example, a person may be able to walk to work if the workplace is
only a few blocks away. The person may choose to travel to work by train if it
stops very close to his home and his workplace. See id. at 26.
131 See generally Powell, supra note 121 (discussing former Prime Minister
Major's plans to stop strip mall growth).
134 See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 26-27.
13 For example, Switzerland has a "Federal Town and County Planning
Law," which attempts to achieve reduction in home-to-work trips with empha-
sis on reduced parking and increased public transport. The plan has resulted in
a 40% public transport ridership increase in Bern. The Hague in The Nether-
lands gave large tax breaks to businesses located near public transport, and as of
1990 found that there was a 50% decrease in car usage. Sweden's Traffic Plan-
ning Guidelines also discourage the use of autos in favor of public transport.
See id. at 28.
136 See id. at 29.
137 See id.
131 See id. at 30.
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cars around to use for other trips during the day.139 The cost-
effectiveness is currently unknown, but one forecast estimates a
$23 billion savings in transport and energy costs given a 10% to
20% increase in telecommuting."4° Other problems include chang-
ing management attitudes; questions of security, control, and li-
ability; health and safety concerns; zoning restrictions; and effects
on productivity."
Other government-sponsored projects include large scale trav-
eler-information services. These programs provide preparatory
information on which routes to take and when to take them, car-
pooling, and other modes of transportation." The goal of that
type of service is to make it as convenient as possible for travelers
to access the best information quickly. The information services
also have the advantage of being able to better direct efforts at
particular travel markets such as commuters, students, or tour-
ists." 3 Traveler information service is a type of "road traffic op-
erations" which includes all measures that manipulate the road
system to encourage, enable, or force the most efficient traffic
flow."4 Road traffic operations systems, when operating opti-
mally, may be able to improve average speeds by 20%.' Infor-
mation which could help relieve pressure on the overburdened in-
frastructure can be disseminated by mail, television, radio, and
work bulletin boards. 46 Once again, large informational costs ex-
139 However, these trips are likely to be shorter and at off-peak times. See
140 See id. at 31. Examples of telecommuting projects in California show
that work trip rates decreased from 0.9 to 0.63 trips per day for state employ-
ees. In The Netherlands, participants in a project worked 20% to 60% of the
time at home, and there were 15% fewer journeys made and no noted increase
in trips made for other reasons. See id. at 32.
141 But see id. at 31 (noting that one Los Angeles pilot project reported that
80% of telecommuters increased their work productivity).
142 See id. at 33.
143 For example, Europe has several national information centers, such as
Bison Fute' in France and AUTOSTRADE in Italy, which give information to
commuters and travelers. Project "Countdown" in London gives up-to-date
travel time information with electronic signs at bus stops, which draw informa-
tion from vehicle location equipment. The main U.S. method is the use of
rideshare matching programs. See id. at 36-37.
144 See id. at 54.
145 See id. at 56.
146 See id. at 33-35.
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ist 47 There are cross-jurisdictional coordination difficulties and
accuracy problems, as well as problems with getting commuters
to sacrifice what is familiar to them. 148
Land-use and zoning law, telecommuting, traveler informa-
tion systems, and similar aspects of congestion management can
all be categorized as administrative measures. Administrative
measures are "agreements and structures that underlie or help to
enhance implementation of congestion management measures in a
local area." '9 These are not in and of themselves management,
but rather are organizational relationships and regulations which
support aspects of congestion management. 5 The main objective
of these measures is to facilitate the effective implementation of
peak-period car trip reduction measures."5
Administrative action relies upon the participation of the
business community. Businesses can help implement government
policies, influence commuters' mode of transit choices, and pay
147 The U.S. Department of Transportation estimates a typical cost of less
than $7 per day to remove each commuter from the road by using an informa-
tion program. See id. at 35. Road traffic operations may be highly cost-
effective, though, with experience indicating a possible $17 benefit for each $1
invested in programs in major metropolitan areas. See, e.g., id. at 57.
14 See id. at 35-36, 57.
141 Id. at 47.
150 One such relationship is a "business roundtable" which brings together
numerous local employers in a community in order to address issues such as
congestion. See id.
151 This can be accomplished through "transportation partnerships," trip
reduction ordinances, alternative/flexible work schedules, auto-restricted zones
or times, and parking management measures. See id. at 48. Examples include
"auto-restricted zones" as in Visby, Sweden, where a thirteenth-century wall is
preserved and only "legitimate" traffic is allowed to enter the gates during the
summer months; "signal parks" as in Munich, Germany's International Airport
where digital signs guide patrons to the closest unoccupied parking s aces; and
"alternative work schedules" in The Netherlands, where Ministry of Transport
and Public Works em loyees were given the option of working a five-day, 38-
hour week or a four-day, 36-hour week which lowered traffic, but did not alter
mode choice. See id. at 52-53.
Another commonly used measure is "preferential treatment," which im-
proves the travel speed, safety, or reliability of a particular mode of travel.
Some examples of this are bus lanes, HOV lanes, bike lanes, and traffic light
preemption. The goal of preferential treatment measures is to achieve a more
equitable share of the road in order to decrease congestion. The key is saving
time, not necessarily saving money. Regardless, there are still problems of un-
determined costs, enforcement, and empty lanes. See id. at 63-67.
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for the costs of implementation."5 2 However, the costs are not yet
certain. There would be information and administrative costs to
the government and possible compliance costs to employers."3
3.3. Conclusions on Traffic Solutions
An approach which simply builds more roads and increases
road infrastructure is no longer viable in Europe. A lack of space
and a huge overabundance of cars make such solutions inadequate.
Government traffic ministries must turn toward congestion man-
agement techniques. Congestion management integrates various
disciplines of economics, science, and policy. One management
solution, road pricing, compels drivers to pay for their external
costs. ITS and telematics solutions suggest numerous technologi-
cal solutions to traffic congestion problems. Other aspects of
congestion management include regulatory measures which alter
work schedules, regulate land usage, and provide a myriad of in-
formation sources to avoid congested routes. Congestion man-
agement has clearly gained acceptance as the wave of the future.
4. NATIONAL TRAFFIC CONTROL PLANS VERSUS
INTERNATIONAL PLANS
Most traffic management in Europe occurs at the national
level. Each country approaches traffic differently, and each na-
tion attaches a different importance to developing a management
plan. This gives rise to an erratic and inefficient scheme across
Europe. In order to prosper, it will be necessary for Europe to
develop greater coordination between national policies. This will
aid in comparing and developing solutions, as well as in avoiding
conflicts between proposed national plans. Implementation and
regulation of many congestion management applications necessi-
tates coordination. Also, coordination will help defray the large
costs by utilizing collective action and enrolling the aid of the
business community.
The EU is the most logical choice of organizations to enforce
coordination. The EU's policies and mandates make it competent
15 Businesses can change their employees' working hours, create flexible
scheduling, limit parking spaces, and provide commuter passes to employees.
See id. at 50.
"' The U.S. cities which administer their own budgets have costs as high as
$2.60 per employee. Programs may recoup some expenses, but rarely will they
recoup all of the costs. See id. at 51.
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in handling a transnational plan, but there may be some obstacles.
These obstacles are psychological, political, and financial in na-
ture, but for the most part are minor, considering the numerous
benefits of coordination and internationalization of congestion
management.
4.1. The Multiplicity of National Plans Across Europe
Currently, European nations develop their own traffic man-
agement plans. Each country examines and attempts to remedy
its own traffic problems. Although the EU aspires to develop
more sustainable transportation solutions, it has been national
governments, and not the EU, who have generally taken the
lead."14 Many nations emphasize one proposed resolution over
another or emphasize trying to reduce one aspect of traffic rather
than another.' s The result is that Europe has a patchwork of traf-
fic solutions, rather than a network, and "it is a patchwork with
holes in it." 156
National transport development plans occupy places of vary-
ing importance in the politics of European countries. Parliamen-
tary bodies must approve traffic policies in Austria, Switzerland,
the Netherlands, and Germany, while some other countries do
not even have national transport-development plans. 5 Conges-
tion management plans may be separate plans or appear as inte-
grated portions of larger environmental, land-use, safety, or
freight policies. 58
Aside from determining where national traffic policies fit in
the grand scheme of policies within a nation, the approaches to
analyzing the usefulness of such policies vary widely.159 Among
154 See Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on 'Spatial Planning in
Europe,' 1997 Oj. (C 116) 1 [hereinafter Spatial Planning in Europe].
155 EU Members "continue to spend large sums on developing their trans-
port infrastructures.., according to national needs and priorities." The Euro-
pean Union's Transport Policy (last modified Nov. 11, 1997) <http://europa.eu.
int/en/eupol/trans.html > [hereinafter EU Transport Policy].
156 Id.
157 See Quinet, supra note 43, at 61.
158 See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 83-87. In the United
States, the option of having a congestion management plan that is integrated
into a larger policy has not been exercised like it has in Europe, according to
the OECD. See id. at 86 ("While in most European countries, congestion man-
agement is often part of a broader transport policy, in the U.S. congestion man-
agement programmes have been developed as a separate transport policy .....
159 EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 138.
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European nations, several major approaches to traffic congestion
exist which are intended to either influence demand, modify the
modal split,16 gear trends toward the economic and social envi-
ronment, or promote regional development. Since these ap-
proaches focus on different areas, conclusions about their effec-
tiveness are not easy to compare. 6' Some countries separately
calculate the international traffic component, while others do not.
Nations utilize different methods of counting cars, including
counting by the number of vehicles, number of passengers, and
number of miles driven. Even when countries use similar ap-
proaches, their assumptions, calculations, and conclusions about
the effects of traffic on the economy widely vary.'62 For example,
even a simple calculation such as determining losses with respect
to GDP leads to variable results. 63 Some member states examine
optimistic and pessimistic scenarios (The Netherlands and
France), and some nations use factors in addition to GDP when
making such calculations (Germany and The Netherlands)."
When examining "traffic," members of the EU categorize traffic
by methods which seem to be haphazardly chosen.16 The ECMT
argues that the chosen methods are unhelpful and insufficient.
They would favor greater studies including breakdowns by length
of haul, by purpose of the journey, by number of passengers, by
income of passengers, by delineating type and origin of freight, or
by studying travel between zones within a country.166
160 The modal split is the breakdown of numbers of people who take dif-
ferent modes of transport, i.e., the number who travel by automobile, rail
transport, air transport. See id. at 130.
161 See id. at 138.
16I A related problem is the complete lack of good records. The ECMT
emphasizes the need for common bases and data. See id. at 42, 210 (lamenting
the lack of good data on tourism traffic, a largely ignored, key international
traffic component).
163 See id. at 119 (outlining the calculations by Germany, Spain, Finland,
France, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and The Netherlands).
164 See id. at 120-21.
165 Proper categorization includes distinctions based on origin or destina-
tion, major or minor flows, and purpose of trip. Seeid. at 124-26.
1I See id. at 126-29.
19981
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
4.2. An International Approach to Traffic and the European
Common Market
Apart from an inability to compare methods and their effec-
tiveness, it would not matter what resolution a country chose if
the European nations were isolated or did not aspire toward the
creation of a European Common Market."' "[A]ctions imple-
mented at [the] national level have an impact on the fluidity of
traffic flows across Europe and reciprocally, international traffic is
becoming an increasingly important component of economic and
social activity and accounting for an ever larger share of total traf-
fic."168 In many cases, planning for the resolution of some traffic
difficulty in one region or nation will encroach upon other ar-
eas.1 69 Therefore, "urban areas should be encouraged to deal with
transportation problems on an overall integrated basis to attack
problems which spill over the boundaries of individual govern-
mental units."7 ° With the noted increase in international traffic
and the emphasis upon globalization,171 these considerations be-
come increasingly important. However, stemming national traf-
fic congestion remains the main concern of most nations. 2 More
damaging to international traffic congestion is the fact that na-
tions may be unwilling to subdue their international competitive-
ness, and thus usually react leniently when faced with interna-
tional traffic solutions.
1 7 3
167 This is especially noteworthy because even though the United King-
dom, Portugal, and Scandinavia are arguably "isolated," they clearly support
the EU's plans for a common market. See P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 1-14 (5th ed. 1990).
168 EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 24; see also infra Section 2.2.
169 See HART, supra note 8, at 36 ("[E]verything affects everything else,"
says R.M. Kirwan, an urban planner).
170 Id. at 40 (internal quotes and citation omitted).
171 One EU body has defined globalization as"the intensification of inter-
national competition through the emergence of a potentially unijue worldwide
market for an expanding range of goods, services and factors, [which] brings out
the full importance of that responsibility on the part of national and Commu-
nity authorities as regards competitiveness." See Chapter 2: The Conditions for
Growth and Enhanced Competitiveness (visited January 10, 1998)
<http://ig.cs.tu-berlin.de/EU/WhitePaper/ch2a/ch2a 1.html> [hereinafter
Conditions for Growth]; see also EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 23
("[G]lobalisation... can no longer be dissociated from concern with environ-
mental protection and the preservation of the quality of life.").
"72 See EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 117.
173 See Bleijenberg, supra note 91, at 104.
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This tragic fact should no longer be the case in Europe, be-
cause the EU has recognized the necessity of creating a common
market in order to compete in an increasingly global market."
To compete in the globalized market, the EU's "Agenda 2000"
aims at developing a single currency and accomplishing four ele-
ments of internal reform: (1) greater budget priority to the EU's
internal policies, such as research and development; (2) the con-
firmation of economic and social cohesiveness as a top priority;
(3) agricultural reform; and (4) the extension of external relation-
ships and expansion."' The EU also recognizes that while "the
globality and complexity of the [transport] system has become
more widespread, the solutions proposed have largely remained
inoperative.... ." 6 For these reasons, the ECMT's traffic objec-
tives are threefold: (1) to examine whether different countries act
consistently; (2) to adopt global approaches to national and inter-
national traffic; and, (3) to collect a large amount of the latest
data.""
The approach that simply compared various countries' poli-
cies and experiences is no longer helpful to the current market-
place. Harmonization should be the goal, and some keys to
reaching that goal include coordination of planning, general
speeding up of the process, and taking account of international
factors.' 8 The Maastricht Treaty on European Union7 9 speaks of
the development of a pan-European plan which serves as good
evidence of its importance, however it gives no entitlement estab-
lishing either priorities or commitments."' Maastricht gives
174 See Conditions for Growth, supra note 171 ("For the level of employment
in the Community to improve, firms must achieve global competitiveness.").
171 See The European Commission: The Week in Europe, M2 PRESsWlRE, Sept.
26, 1997, available in LEXIS Library, Wire Service Stories (summarizing a
speech by European Commission President Jacques Santer on Sept. 19, 1997).
176 EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 53.
177 See id. at 117.
178 See id. at 11.
17 Referred to as the "Maastricht Treaty" or simply "Maastricht," the
treaty was signed February 7, 1992, and became effective on January 1, 1993.
This treaty lays the foundations for the Economic and Monetary Union. See
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7,1992, 32 I.L.M. 1693; see also GEORGE A.
BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
16 (1993). For information on the EU generally, seeMATHIJSEN, supra note
167 and Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The "1992 Project": Stages, Structures, Results
and Prospects, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1097 (1990).
I See EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
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transport a new dimension of importance by assigning it "a role
in the promotion of economic and social integration in
Europe." 8 We can interpret this to mean that a unified market
will only occur if there are satisfactory networks of transporta-
tion and communication, and that freedom of movement and
trade is only effective if the networks are good. 82 If the EU
wishes to meet its noble goals, it should set forth a method for
recognizing transport needs, establishing objectives, and carrying-
out the necessary work in a timely fashion.
A trans-European network,1 83 overseen by a central body, will
contribute to the attainment of major Community objectives,
such as the functioning of the common market and the strength-
ening of socio-economic cohesion."' Europe's ascendancy will be
due in part to its ability to develop the movement of people and
goods, "marry[ing] economic prosperity, quality of life and com-
mercial efficiency." 8 ' The Commission has recognized that the
current model is inadequate for this mission. 86 A trans-European
network could accomplish numerous goals such as the following:
181 Id. at 195; see also Opinion on Urban Development and the European
Union, 1996 O.J. (C 100) 78, 85 [hereinafter Urban Development and the EU]
(stating that Article 129b of Maastricht calls for the establishment of transna-
tional networks in the area of transport).
182 See EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 195.
183 The network includes motorways and high quality roads which: (1) play
an important role in long-distance traffic, (2) bypass the main urban centers, (3)
providte interconnection with other modes of transp ort, or (4) link land-locked
or peripheral regions. See Council Directive 1692/96, art. 5, 1996 O.J. (L 228)
1-2.
184 See id. at 1; see also Development Theme IL Trans-European Transport and
Energy Networks (visited Jan. 10, 1998) < http://ig.cs.tu-berin.de /EU7 White-
Paper/ch02/ch02 1.html> [hereinafter Development Theme I] (explaining
how a trans-European network would seek optimum multi-modality and com-
plete the single market).
185 Development Theme II, supra note 184.
186 The Commission relies on several factors in drawing its conclusions.
First, sustainable mobility is dependent on a reduction of traffic flows. Second,
passenger traffic is impeding freight and business. Third, increasingintermodal-
ity will reduce and shift the traffic. Fourth, there is a direct link between con-
struction of trans-European networks and promoting public transport. Fifth,
all costs incurred by transport must be allocated to the various modes ration-
ally. Sixth, community objectives on government procurement require inclu-
sion of public transport. Seventh, more resources should be made available to
the EU. Finally, eighth, the obstacles to the social and economic development
of the peripheral regions of the EU, perpetuated by their remoteness, could be
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(1) creating a more vigorous economy; (2) providing the highest
safety and the least congestion; (3) offering a wider range of trans-
portation choices to travelers; (4) establishing better connections
between the regions and the periphery of the EU; and (5) includ-
ing third-party links with partner countries in Europe, if neces-
sary.18 Additional benefits could include sustainable mobility18
and possible job creation."' The Commission of the European
Communities hopes that developing a trans-European network by
2010 would do the following: (1) ensure mobility with the best
possible social and safety conditions; (2) offer infrastructure at ac-
ceptable economic terms; (3) include all modes of transport; (4) be
"insofar as possible, economically viable;" and (5) cover the whole
territory of the Member States, thereby including peripheral re-
gions.19
4.2.1. Integrating Urban Areas into the International
Network
One area of further concern for the EU is integration of its
urban areas. These areas are recognized as sites of the most "in-
novative economic actions in the European Union," and as "cen-
tral to the economy of their regions and states and to the competi-
tiveness of the whole of the European Union."191 The future of
urban areas in the EU is central to the interests of the Union.
The urban areas' interests in relieving traffic congestion relate
rather directly to the Union's interests in relieving traffic conges-
tion. Additionally, traffic congestion relief will have a very posi-
tive effect upon these critical regions. To meet the goal of pro-
187 See EU Transport Policy, supra note 155.
188 The EU has expressed broad support for sustainable transport and rec-
ognizes the imp ortant role it plays in managing congestion. See Opinion of the
Committee of the Regions on the 'Proposal for a Council Decision on the
Promotion of Sustainable and safe Mobility,'" 1997 0.2. (C 244) 33, 33 ("EU
transport policy must be developed and given practical substance in order to
promote sustainable and safe mobility throughout the whole transport sec-
tor.").
189 See European Parliament and Council Decision 1692/96, 1996 OJ. (L
228) 1, 1. The transport sector is pivotal to the overall EU economy. See EU
Transport Policy, supra note 155 (noting that transport accounts for an estimated
6.5% of the EU's GNP and employs more than six million people).
19' European Parliament and Council Decision 1692/96, supra note 189,
art. 2, at 2.
191 Urban Development and the EU, supra note 181, at 78.
192 See id. at 82.
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viding the urban areas with instruments to manage and develop
their social and economic foundations, the EU must develop a
more uniform urban transportation policy. 93 Simultaneously,
uniform congestion management solutions for the entire EU
should be developed. Ultimately, the goal in this area is a fairly
simple one: "common policy in transport."1 94
4.2.2. Institutional Regulation
A policy aiming for uniformity inevitably must include insti-
tutional regulation. The regulations should operate along demo-
cratic lines concerning long-term decisions and recognize that in-
tervention by international, as well as national and regional
institutions, is legitimate.19 This is one of the theories underlying
the Prague Declaration of October 31, 1991, made by representa-
tives of the governments of the European States together with
representatives of international organizations. The Declaration
laid the foundations of pan-European transport policy and set
forth three goals with regard to transportation: (1) "[i]ntegration
of the socio-economic effects and environmental impact" of
transport systems; (2) "[slpatial integration" by means of infra-
structure projects that supersede national plans; and (3) a global
approach to multi-modal integration. 96 By increasing interna-
tional institutional regulation, the EU can affect the market and
national policies adopted with respect to congestion manage-
ment. 97 Fortunately, some EU bodies have already recognized
the importance and effects of international cooperation.198
193 See id. at 89 ("[Uirban policy is already being developed at a European
level, but in a fragmented and uncoordinated way."). The coordination of ur-
ban policy is needed to enable European urban policy to be clarified with re-
spect to the overall coordination policy and to help ascertain the appropriate
level of policy implementation. See id.
194 Id. at 82.
195 See EUROPEAN TRANsPORT, supra note 1, at 204.
196 Id. at 196, 200.
197 See id. at 204.
19 See Spatial Planning in Europe, supra note 154 § 1.3.3 ("There was ...
unanimous recognition of the remarkable effect that cross-border and trans-
national cooperation has on accessibility ... ."); see also Fong, supra note 65, at
482 ("[I]nternational cooperation can be a powerful tool in creating beneficial
transportation programs.").
Fong's article demonstrates that international cooperation need not only
take place between EU nations in order to be effective. As an example, Fong
described a very successful "sister city" project between Minnesota's Depart-
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As discussed above,199 it is necessary to develop better data-
bases on traffic flows across the EU as a whole. One key element
that the EU must address is the "marked deficiency of interna-
tional statistics on flows" of international traffic."0 The devel-
opment of a uniform European system of statistics would be very
helpful. These data would assist the EU, as well as the Member
States, in deciding which investments would make the most effi-
cient use of existing networks, especially in light of the growing
international traffic.
Any regulation of the rapidly increasing international aspects
of traffic has effects upon the EU as a whole. Since international
traffic accounts for a lesser part of traffic in densely populated ar-
eas, national policies often fail to adequately address it.2 1 There-
fore, the main aim of coordinating data is to address the interna-
tional traffic problem. International mobility must be given
adequate consideration, and the effects of measures narrowly tai-
lored to daily journeys in high density areas should also be exam-
ined.0 2 An international body such as the EU Commission0 3 or
one of its Committees is best suited to coordinate this effort.
Even if an EU body does not administer the policy, internation-
alization of policies would help in at least two ways: (1) setting
uniform, easy to understand charges for road-pricing and educa-
tion programs for travelers, and (2) ensuring exchanges of experi-
ence in order to optimize and establish more compatibility among
decentralized plans. 4 This would be particularly beneficial for
centrally-located European countries where concentrations of in-
ternational traffic are highest.
Nevertheless, even for the balance of the EU Member States,
centrality offers the benefit of association with an "economically
ment of Transportation and the Finnish National Road Administration. An
agreement was drafted between the two countries' agencies that "included pro-
visions for developing 'professional exchanges and visits, co-operative research
programs and shared knowledge ... .'" Id. at 475.
199 See supra notes 161-166 and accompanying text.
200 EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
201 See id. at 16. In addition, most authorities throughout Europe are local.
202 See id. at 21.
203 For a discussion of the workings of EU Government bodies, see infra
note 221.
2C4 See EUROPEAN TRANsPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
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integrated and politically harmonious entity."0" Thus, peripheral
nations, which view a European approach and a national ap-
proach as mutually exclusive options,2 6 must be convinced that a
European approach is necessary to accomplish the laudable goals
of the EU. "The European area must be seen as a coherent whole




Despite calls for uniformity, one cannot lose sight of the fact
that "[t]here are no perfect transportation patterns because this
presupposes a level of uniformity among cities which does not in
fact exist." 20 1 Inevitably, some diversity exists among schemes.2 9
For this reason, regional and local authorities are the most effec-
tive partners in EU-planning projects.210 Still, the schemes should
be compatible with international aspects of travel: justifying as-
sumptions of growth and clarifying the assumptions in circum-
stances in which international traffic flow has been considered.211
All in all,
Regional and local policy-makers understand better than
anyone the problems facing their areas and the solutions
205 Id. at 70. Evidence of this can be drawn from the fact that centrally lo-
cated European countries have the most mature national networks. Maturity is
measured by looking at traffic data availability, attempts at political solutions,
and suggested solutions which extend beyond merely increasing supply. It is
largely the peripheral countries (excluding the UK and the Scandinavian coun-
tries) that are behind in this area. See id. at 69.
206 See id. at 91.
207 Id. at 213.
208 HART, supra note 8, at 36.
209 See EUROPEAN TRANsPORT, supra note 1, at 13 (attributing diversity to
national and regional options).
One approach advocated to promote cooperation among territorial groups
is the use of a regional determination scheme based upon three factors: (1) geog-
raphy; (2) history and culture (which have largely been submerged, but need to
be rediscovered); and (3) economy, including similarities in types of economic
activity, living standards, and pollution concerns. See Spatial Planning in
Europe, supra note 154, at 3.
210 See Spatial Planning in Europe, supra note 154, § 1.2.3.
211 See EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 14; see also id. (arguing that
local authorities must recognize that their collective responsibility is to all
other parts of the EU).
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required. They are also aware that they cannot resolve all
the problems alone. As neighboring regional and local
authorities have to address the same problems, they find
that the most logical and effective action is to combine ef-
forts in order to find common solutions and pool re-
sources to implement them. They have no apprehen-
sion... and focus rather on the potential extra benefit to
be derived.... This will to cooperate is essentially dic-
tated by efficiency.212
4.2.4. Financing the Proposed Solutions
This drive toward efficiency underscores the need for central-
ized fundraising. The suggested solutions to the growing problem
of traffic congestion are associated with high costs. The existing
financial situation for most individual Member States leaves little
margin for increasing public financing beyond what is currently
planned. Thus, massive investment requires greater public-private
partnerships.1 Current needs are estimated at ECU 30 to 35 bil-
lion per year, and given current finances, the EU would need
ECU 130 billion, outside of member states' contributions, to pro-
ceed.214 The EU must encourage private investment, which is
currently provided rather reluctantly.21 Since the European
Community Treaty ("EC Treaty") assigns to the EU the respon-
sibility of coordinating its members, the EU should launch the
necessary fund-raising and education campaign. As previously ar-
gued in this comment, a unified effort would be more successful.
Community-level activity is a catalyst essential to unlocking pri-
vate investment in a common market." 6
212 Spatial Planning in Europe, supra note 154, 5 1.1.1.
213 See Chapter 3: Trans-European Networks, S 3.3 (visited January 10, 1998)
<http://ig.cs.tu-berlin.de/EU/WhitePaper/ch3/ch3_l.html> [hereinafter
Chapter 3].
214 See id. § 3.4 (estimating a ECU 220 billion investment for trans-
European networks of which amount the EU could mobilize ECU 90 billion).
21 This can be attributed to the inherent risks in such projects, as well as
uncertain profits. See id. This comment suggests that these risks and uncertain-
ties should be recognized and eliminated through more effective international
congestion management.
216 See id. 3.3.
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4.3. Competence of the European Union to Decide Congestion
Management
Calls for the EU to become more involved in developing an
integrated, trans-national congestion management policy obvi-
ously assume that the Union has the competence to make such
decisions. Several EC Treaty articles call for and give the Union
authority to publicly run transport services if that is deemed nec-
essary.21 The Treaty of Rome (Treaty of a European Economic
Community, or the "EEC Treaty") urges a common transport
policy.218 The Commission has stated that Article 130 of the EC
Treaty "sets as a priority objective the harmonious development
of the Union and stipulates that this should be achieved by means
of action of all kinds leading to the strengthening of economic
and social cohesion, in particular, reducing disparities between the
levels of development of the various regions.... 219 A broad
construal of this objective would include shaping a sustainable
public transport network for the benefit of all citizens. Coordi-
nation of these networks should take place at the Union level.22
Since this duty falls within the powers of the EU, a failure to ex-
ercise them may ultimately result in a failure to design a solution
to congestion problems.
To avoid this, the EU must take better advantage of the policy
instruments available to it. The EU has the ability to pass legisla-
tion aimed at harmonizing the fiscal and technical provisions of
the policies of Member States. 1 Other pivotal EU roles include
217 See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992,
arts. 75,77,90 OJ. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter
EC TREATY].
218 See EEC TREATY arts. 3(e), 74-75. Other articles provide the necessary
provisions. See id. arts. 61, 75-84. Trans-European networks are also specifi-
caly mentioned. See id. arts. 129 b-129 d.
Despite such authority, progress in the area has been slow. There was vir-
tual stagnation until 1985, when the Court of Justice upheld part of an action
brought by the European Parliament against the Council of Ministers for a fail-
ure by the Ministers to provide international transport services. See EU Trans-
port Policy, supra note 155. There has been progress ever since the 1985 deci-
sion, but the activity must be heightened if the EU wishes to meet its common
market goals.
219 Resolution on the Green Paper, supra note 117.
220 See id.
221 See EU Transport Policy, supra note 155. There are three main legisla-
tive/executive bodies within the Union. The Commission initiates all propos-
als for legislation, manages EU spending, and acts as a catalyst for raising funds.
[Vol 19:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss3/5
CONGESTIONMANA GEMENTIN THE EU
creating guidelines, researching and developing technical solu-
tions, and financing or helping to raise national funds.'
4.4. Possible Obstacles to a Uniform Congestion Management
Policy
As discussed in Section 3.1. of this Comment, implementation
of a suitable program may be hindered by the large number of
territorial jurisdictions that must be included. The fact that many
countries leave transport policy to numerous regional and local
authorities multiplies the negative effects.' The absence of a sin-
gle authority 4 hinders the production of a comprehensive and ef-
fective program. Since "rational transport operation demands
[that] responsibility.., be exercised at [a] network rather than [a]
territorial level," " ideally the EU should eliminate, consolidate,
or define the roles of the local authorities in order to succeed.
This solution, however, conflicts with the principle of "sub-
sidiarity" which underlies the European Union. Subsidiarity
"means that each territorial level of authority acts within the lim-
its of the powers conferred upon it and the objectives assigned to
it." 6 There is a constant demand made by regions that this prin-
ciple be observed. Subsidiarity is critical because "it embodies the
competence which these authorities derive from their electoral
The Council of Ministers adopts decisions by a qualified majority, but the
Commission has veto power. The European Parliament works with the Coun-
cil of Ministers. The Parliament may amend proposals, but the Council has
veto power. The Parliament's role is largely informational. However, for
many provisions regarding trans-European networking, a co-decision procedure
between the Parliament and the Commission is used. See generally BERMANN
ET AL., supra note 179.
m See EU Transport Policy, supra note 155; see also discussion infra Section
5.
In London, 33 boroughs have decisive power over road improvement.
In France, different roads in a zone may fall under state, department, or com-
munal control. See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 87; see also HART,
supra note 8, at 25-26 (noting that although London's traffic problem was evi-
dent for many years, no single organization existed to solve it).
114 See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 88 ("[A]s a rule no agency
has the task of tackling congestion as a whole and therefore no agency is in a
position to deal with it effectively.").
Z2 Id.
2 Spatia Planning in Europe, supra note 154, § 1.6; see also Albert Breton
et al., Decentralization and Subsidiarity: Toward a Theoretical Reconciliation, 19
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 21 (discussing the subsidiarity conundrum).
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mandate... ."' The EU must be careful not to upset the deli-
cate balance underlying its own mandate and the mandate given
to these authorities.~8
Even assuming that the EU possesses the requisite authority,
instituting large-scale regulations generally faces other barriers.
Currently, most democracies are experiencing a general with-
drawal of state intervention and regulation, which reflects the
public's social preferences. 9 Failure to communicate with the
public may hinder any policy aimed at traffic congestion reform,
but traffic information systems, which require public interaction,
will be most severely impacted." ° There are both real and psy-
chological obstacles which prevent the proposal and effectiveness
of many policies, specifically those attempting to enforce inter-
nalization."' The real obstacles include practical problems such as
high transaction costs" and the difficulty of designing systems
which will only minimally infringe upon the privacy of individu-
als. 3 The EU faces additional problems including classification
Spatial Planning in Europe, supra note 154, § 1.6.2.
228 Another problem faced by the EU, as with any complex plan involving
multiple actors, is the collective action problem. Analysts enumerate three
theories that may cause actors not to join a uniform cause. The first is interest
based; self-interested parties must calculate that the benefits of coordination
outweigh its costs, and they may be unwilling to do so. The second theory is
based upon knowledge; a consensus regarding the causal relations of the prob-
lem must exist. A third consideration is power based; there must be adequate
resolution of the smaller nations' concerns about equity in the partnership. See
Ileana M. Porras, Book Review, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 703, 704-05 (reviewing
KAREN T. LITFIN, OZONE DISCOURSES: SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (1995) and IAN H. ROWLANDS, THE
POLITICS OF GLOBAL ATMOSPHERIC CHANGE (1995)).
229 See Button, supra note 40, at 21.
230 Existing systems have difficulty meeting the needs for interaction. See
CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 88-89.
231 See Button, supra note 40, at 21.
232 See id. at 22; see also Quinet, supra note 43, at 62 (noting that regulations
do not lead to optimal solutions at the lowest costs and requir costly policing);
Rothengatter, supra note 93, at 129-30 (listing transaction costs including:
preparation, planning, equipment, information and advertising, and enforce-
ment).
233 See Button, supra note 40, at 22; seealso Alpert, supra note 124, at 97-98.
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problems,"4 principal-agent problems,23 inflexibility, 6 and mis-
useY Psychological obstacles include overturning the public per-
ception of an asymmetry between the costs of regulation and its
intangible benefits. 8 The costs of regulated internalization will
be very high, especially because individuals are not accustomed to
paying for use of the roads. It will be difficult to convince the
public that these payments, along with the additional administra-
tive costs, are in their best interests because the measures will re-
duce traffic congestion and thus help the economy. Regulation
also requires that regulators develop a long-term plan. Unfortu-
nately, there is little incentive for a legislator to look at the appli-
cations of a policy beyond his or her term of office. 9 The EU
must avoid the tendency of administrators to "respond to public
concern by instituting measures which [merely] appear to address
the problem, even though there may be doubt[s] as to their effec-
tiveness.""
These problems, which address the central tenets of conges-
tion management policies, can be overcome with a clear transport
234 The problem of classification is to define which classes or zones should
be targeted. See Rothengatter, supra note 93, at 130-31.
... The principal-agent problem, with regard to road pricing in particular,
"can be roughly defined as the process of establishing a system otpayments, in-
formation ows and control mechanisms to ensure that the professional man-
agers fulfil[sic] the objectives of the capital owners, while still making a profit
for themselves." Id. at 131.
236 Reulations are often too rigid to allow for individual exceptions to a
general rule. See id. at 118.
27 Regulation can encourage people to expend energy and intelligence to
circumvent the rules, can be used as a national policy to protect the home mar-
ket from competition, and may not create enough incentives to promote inno-
vation or dynamic efficiency. See id.; see also Quinet, supra note 43, at 62 (de-
scribing problems of conversion for personal benefit and other unintended side-effects of regulation).
23 See Button, supra note 40, at 22. This is made particularly difficult by
interest groups which may expend substantial amounts of money to block re-
form if they perceive any kind of threat.
239 See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 89. See generally ROBERT
A. DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS 101-02 (2d ed. 1970) (illuminating
the factors generally considered when developing a broad policy, such as the
following: (1) alternatives available; (2) likely consequences of each alternative;
(3) value to the individual of each set of consequences; (4) estimation of the rela-
tive probability of the consequences; and (5) one's attitude toward risk aver-
sion).
240 CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 90.
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policy.241 Currently, at the international level, there is a "lack of
precise political objectives," which is a "severe handicap to the in-
troduction of coherent programmes."242 Unclear transport poli-
cies are at the source of many traffic congestion problems; this
conclusion provides a good reason to develop a standardized in-
ternational approach to traffic to overcome the coordination
problems that exist.243 Without cooperation among nations and a
national authority, problems are multiplied and incentives are
created for countries to act against the best interests of the Union.
As a result, the EU will need to increase its role in the effort to
clarify policy.
4.5. Conclusions on an International Traffic Plan
The patchwork of national plans across Europe does not
work. To increase efficiency, countries must develop an interna-
tional plan. This plan would help integrate the European Com-
mon Market, particularly urban areas, and generally benefit all
nations. It would provide a better method for determining the
most effective solutions, avoid conflicts among nations, integrate
administrative and regulatory approaches to ITS and road pricing
solutions, and help pay for the expected high costs of congestion
management. Some regional involvement must exist in recogni-
tion of the importance of the principle of subsidiarity, but an in-
ternationally-developed plan, overseen by the EU, would be the
most effective approach. Some obstacles exist which may hinder
greater regulation, particularly at the international level, but the
current system does not work. The huge costs and rapidly in-
creasing amounts of traffic, both domestic and international, de-
mand extreme measures. Extreme measures rely upon interna-
tional involvement. International involvement is feasible and
required.
5. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN CONGESTION
MANAGEMENT
A coherent international congestion policy offers numerous
advantages, and the EU, clearly, should have a role in implement-
ing such a policy. Neil Kinnock, the EU Head Minister of
241 See id. at 94.
242 Id.
243 See id. at 92-93.
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Transport, has agreed that the EU must play such a role by stat-
ing that, "[N]ational and local government, public and private fi-
nance and industry and the European Union itself must be em-
ployed in the task of achieving 'sustainable mobility' .... .24 The
scope and definition of the EU's role are still unclear, but many
aspects of congestion management would benefit from broader
administration at the trans-national level. The primary role of the
EU should be to promote integrated planning. This will have
two benefits: (1) it will prevent pointless, cost-intensive, parallel
investment, and (2) it could also reduce the negative effects one
nation, region, or locality has upon the trans-European network
and international traffic flow.24 The Union should direct its role
toward fostering a trans-European network in accordance with its
goals of integrating the market and promoting cohesion.246 The
EU must be mindful of its role and the role of regional communi-
ties. "[A]ction by the Community to establish guidelines is neces-
sary[,] in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity[,]... to es-
tablish the broad lines and the priorities of the Community action
proposed in the field of trans-European transport networks."24
While Kinnock urges that the main tasks should be facilitat-
ing, enabling, and encouraging improvement248- all noble and
proper goals- they are not enough. 2" 9 The EU role must also in-
clude financing, research, and development. The Union has at
least two tasks in this respect: (1) reducing financial administra-
tive risks involved, and (2) encouraging private investment to take
244 See Kinnock, supra note 17 (emphasis added); see also infra note 87 (de-
fining "sustainable mobility").
245 See Resolution on the Green Paper, supra note 117, at 29-30.
246 The EU Commission has defined the scope of such a network to include
the following: (1) transport infrastructure, traffic management systems, and po-
sitioning and navigation systems; (2) road, rail, and inland waterway networks
and seaports; and (3) technical installations to ensure harmonious operation of
the network and efficient traffic management. See Council Decision 1692/96,
art. 3, 1996 OJ. (L 228) 1.
247 Id. pmbl. § 6.
248 In addition, the Minister states that many of the actions necessary"must
obviously and rightly" be taken at the national, regional, or local level. See
Kinnock, supra note 17.
249 See EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 2-3. But see Daniel John,
Road Jams Not EC at Issue, Says Minister, THE GUARDIAN (London), July 28,
1992, Home Section, at 4 (recounting statements made by John MacGregor,
Transport Secretary of Britain, that Britain will "ignore any attempt by the
European Community to block its road building programme on the grounds
that solving congestion is a national issue, not a community problem.").
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a greater part in projects of European interest.250 These projects
should focus on an integrated, smartly-managed network. Be-
cause of the high costs associated with this proposal and the na-
ture of all citizens as transport consumers, it is necessary for the
EU to encourage involvement by the private sector.251 The EU
must play an important role252 in selecting projects to ease the
traffic congestion burden.
5.1. EU Role in Congestion Pricing and Internalization
Measures
Since eliminating external costs is increasingly important in
today's climate, and there are huge external costs associated with
traffic congestion,253 it makes sense that the EU should greatly ex-
pand its role in this area. The effectiveness of such a policy may
depend on international oversight. The external costs to the Un-
ion as a whole totaled ECU 250 billion in 1991, and 90% of these
costs have been attributed to road transport. 4  In order to
achieve a trans-European network, road pricing must be consid-
ered appropriate."' As noted in Section 2.3.1. of this Comment,
most traffic costs can be attributed to the failure to internalize
costs. Without forcing internalization by road pricing, a veiled
subsidy will continue to exist and will give little incentive for in-
dividuals or businesses to change their approaches to transit.
The EU is the best organ for examining the range of external
costs. An international body should collect and compare the
various territory's and region's data in order to ensure fair, effi-
cient, accurate and tolerable pricing.25 Tolerability is particularly
important, because consumers will most likely be displeased with
250 See Development Theme II, supra note 184 S 3; see also supra Section 4.2.4.
21 See Resolution on the Green Paper, supra note 117, at 36.
252 Included in this role is that the EU base its selection upon (1) commu-
nity interest; (2) evaluation of the risks in seeking private investment; (3) prior-
ity for short notice projects; (4) economic importance or job creation; and (5)
satisfaction of environmental impact scrutiny. See Development Theme 11, supra
note 184, S 3.
253 See discussion supra Section 2.3.1.
254 See Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Green Paper: To-
wards Fair and Efficient Pricing in Transport- Policy Options for Internaliz-
ing the External Costs of Transport in the European Union, 1997 OJ. (C 116)
58, 59 [hereinafter Opinion on the Green Paper].
255 See Resolution on the Green Paper, supra note 117, at 15.
256 See Opinion on the Green Paper, supra note 254, at 59.
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an end to the subsidy of congestion. By creating uniformity
across the market, a country's own citizens as well as interna-
tional travelers will have fewer reasons to gripe. As Kinnock
notes, uniformity will ensure greater fairness, since effective road
pricing must differentiate between types of vehicle, and times and
places of travel." 7
The EU plays a crucial role in ensuring that the systems are
compatible." This will buttress the EU's strategy to "promote
more efficient transport systems by creating a market where
prices and direct regulatory measures are designed to help make
transport systems fairer, more balanced and more rational, with
the aim of ensuring sustainable transport development. " "' A va-
riety of different tax systems in the member states will create dis-
tortions in the competition between companies within the EU
and will hinder the common market.26 Although the EU does
not yet have "persuasive evidence that the overall approach to
solving transport problems via market prices and internalizing ex-
ternal costs will definitely relieve congestion in the European Un-
ion transport system,"261 the Union cannot lose sight of the fact
that congestion management includes many aspects beyond road
pricing. There must be greater support for multimodal transport
as well as technological solutions which go hand-in-hand with
road pricing.
5.2. EU Role in Helping to Develop Telematics Solutions
Technological solutions are costly, in large part due to their
experimental nature.262 However, the results are extremely prom-
s See Resolution on the Green Paper, supra note 117, at 3.
2 A harmonization of taxes and charges will enable the market to func-
tion smoothly. See Opinion on the Green Paper, supra note 254, at 59.
259 Id. at 58.
26 In many cases, the flow of traffic is hampered by restrictive regional pol-
icy measures. It is fine for regional planning to determine demand and needs,
but the overall objectives must be determinedat the EU level. See id. at 59.
261 Id.
262 Current estimates for the costs of implementation of some intelligent
systems in 43 million cars could run as high as $4.6 billion in collision avoid-
ance and $8.4 billion in in-car navigation. The costs of an integrated system are
not yet estimated. However, Dr. Nick Evans, Director of Stanford Research
Institute International, a global ITS proponent, estimates costs will be 95%
lower than the costs for building and infrastructure. See Intelligent Systems, su-
pra note 122, at 7.
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ising.263 Technology plays a crucial role in automatic tolls, park-
ing and congestion pricing, as well as information systems.2 The
investment required to equip Europe with the necessary technol-
ogy will be sizable, but so will its positive impact." 5 The neces-
sary investment should come from funds raised and contributed
by the EU. By merely drawing attention to its current projects
and emphasizing its promise, the EU lends credibility to them
and may attract the necessary funding.266
To a large extent, though, due to contributions of private
companies,267 the technology is now available. Currently, the
primary obstacle is determining the best way to integrate the sys-
tem."8 The only way a system can flourish is with government
cooperation.269 The only way a European system could flourish is
with EU cooperation, because of the unique nature of its interna-
tional traffic flow and desire for a common market.' The EU's
involvement is vital because there is a need for political clarifica-
tion as to which system will be pursued to enable further research
263 "Looking at the current [research and development] programmes con-
cerning advanced technologies,... one could get the impression that the future
of congestion control and demand management has just begun." CONGESTION
CONTROL, supra note 4, at 123-24.
264 See id. at 125. See generally Robert Bond, UK Traffic Management - Mo-
toring Towards the Millennium, REUTER TEXTLINE SURVEYOR, Jan. 16, 1997,
available in LEXIS.
265 See TRANS-EUROPEAN NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 65.
266 See Resolution on the Green Paper, supra note 117, at 7.
267 This includes many car companies which have an impact upon the
European and American economy, such as Ford and BMW. Other consortia of
public institutions and industry groups exist in Palo Alto, Brussels, Washing-
ton, Detroit, and Tokyo. See Intelligent Systems, supra note 122, at 7. It also
includes the new and expanding industry of traffic management systems com-
panies. One such company, Peek, has developed a system for deducting tolls
automatically at pay booths, thus making it unnecessary for drivers to stop. See
Thapar, supra note 25, at 11.
268 See Intelli ent Systems, supra note 122, at 7. It is critical that the system
is widely availabe in order to transform the efficiency of individual journeys.
See id. See generally Alpert, supra note 124.
269 See Intelligent Systems, supra note 122, at 7 ("It requires primarily a
commitment from government to direct and fund the creation of the infra-
structure on which 'intelligent' cars and commercial vehicles should be able to
travel much more efficientfy within the next few decades.").
270 The incentive for the EU is clear. The OECD estimates that road traf-
fic congestion in the EU costs more than 100 billion ECU/year. Two percent
of the EU GDP is wasted in man-hours, fuel costs, and other charges. See id.
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and to focus current projects." The EU has a role to play, as
with all congestion management techniques, in telematics: mini-
mizing unnecessary duplication of research.2" Also, it may be
necessary to set aside broad strips of land to create at least a modi-
cum of flexibility for the use of the systems beyond 2000.3
The current congestion notification systems are widely diverse
and beg for standardization, especially when tourism or interna-
tional traffic concerns are considered. 4  "[T]he full potential of
road transport telematics will only be realized at the European
level, if the systems.., achieve an appropriate level of
interoperability and ensure continuity of services to the user." "
Without ensuring the cohesion of advanced high speed networks
into regions, there is some risk of a dichotomy whereby it would
take longer to go to nearby areas than it would between major
centers. 6 In this manner, the EU would need to work closely
with national and regional authorities to ensure compatibility.
5.3. EU Role in Other Aspects of Congestion Management
The EU has an important role to play in all other aspects of
congestion management, like those described in Section 3.2.1.3. of
this Comment, and these deserve to be mentioned. Foremost, the
EU has the ability to aid in formulating regulatory measures.
These measures would cover land use, urban planning, and em-
ployment practices. Inter-urban and urban-to-suburban travel is
out of control in large part due to land use policies that separate
jobs, recreation, and living areas. 7 The EU has already noted the
271 See TRANs-EUROPEAN NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 86.
272 See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 127.
27 See EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 88.
2"4 See Resolution on the Green Paper, supra note 117, at 8. The Resolu-
tion asks for standardization bodies to help define technical standards, within a
framework of Member States investigating, proposing and experimenting, to
determine the best solution to take across the EU.
271 Council Resolution of 17 June 1997 on theDevelopment of Telematics in
Road Transport, in Particular with Respect to Electronic Fee Collection, 1997 O.J.
(C 194) 5.
276 See EUROPEAN TRANSPORT, supra note 1, at 89.
277 See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 26. The United States is
in dire straits in this respect. See Dorschner, supra note 75 (detailing the state of
Florida's planning nightmare due to bedroom communities around Miami).
But cf Carol Jouzaitis, 39 Million People Work, Live Outside City Centers, USA
TODAY, Nov. 4, 1997, 1A (noting that more and more people are now living
and working outside of cities- wreaking even greater havoc on planning).
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importance of creating districts which include home, shopping,
and work areas in close proximity to each other, in order to re-
duce the potential for creating massive commuter jams." If the
EU does not have some guidelines and integration among nations
and regions, these regions could simply shift the congestion to
another area or put the burden on another group besides com-
muters, such as international travelers, who are often overlooked.
The EU should play a role in looking out for all drivers' interests.
Also, the EU could play a key role in examining alternate work
schedules and integrating and assuring uniformity in telecommut-
ing alternatives.
Urban planning also involves-locatihg public transport near
homes and workplaces. 9 This relies on an efficient public trans-
port network. Linking the various networks and making sure
they are compatible is beneficial for international travel and also
for the Union as it strengthens the economy.28 ° The integration is
first a national government responsibility and afterwards an EU
responsibility. The EU can play a role in selecting research and
development projects that also may aid the promotion of public
transport.281 These projects would include ventures with private
business that could be profitable and excellent for the health of
the common market. Aims and goals should include better in-
formation, ease of use (especially for international travelers), com-
fort, cost-effectiveness, and speed. It is hard to imagine that the
EU could not, by sheer encouragement, positively impact multi-
modal public transport.
Europe is facing this problem to a lesser extent than America, due to general
land policies and availability of space. See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note
4, at 20.
278 See Resolution on the Commission Green Paper, supra note 117, at 7
(making a call for guidelines set forth by the EU);see also Underhill, supra note
12, at 35-36.
29 See CONGESTION CONTROL, supra note 4, at 20; see also Underhill, su-
pra note 12, at 35-36.
280 See Kinnock, supra note 17; see also Resolution on the Green Paper, su-
pra note 117.
21 The Commission cautions, however, that 75% of all trips are currently
made by car. See Resolution on the Green Paper, supra note 117, at 7. There-
fore, promotion is necessary, as success is not yet assured. See id.
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5.4. Conclusions on the EU Role
The EU can play a major role in many aspects of congestion
management. The EU is critical to integrating and developing a
plan of road pricing. Road pricing is essential to ending the un-
derlying "subsidy" of traffic congestion in Europe and will func-
tion most effectively on an international scale. EU involvement
will also eliminate anti-competitive side effects of national road-
pricing policies. The EU can also help fund research and devel-
opment of ITS solutions, which will require public and private
funding and cooperation in order to ensure success. In addition,
standardization of public transit and regulatory and administra-
tive measures such as land use zoning, urban planning, and alter-
nate work schedules, will ensure optimal efficiency, eliminate un-
necessarily duplicative spending, and avoid conflicts between
competing national plans within EU nations.
6. CONCLUSION
Congestion is an undeniable problem in the EU; it affects lo-
cal trips and international travelers. The commonly suggested
approach of building more infrastructure has been shown to do
more to hinder resolution of the problem than to help it, and the
costs of congestion continue to escalate astronomically. The cur-
rent approach to transport policy and congestion management
does not sufficiently guarantee relief from congestion. The EU
should examine a more integrated approach, one that considers all
alternatives. In order to simplify this examination, comparisons
of the various approaches already in use throughout Europe's cit-
ies and regions should be aided by EU involvement in the enter-
prise.
The approach must consider a number of options, including
public transit, urban planning, administrative regulation, conges-
tion-pricing, and ITS. The EU has a role to play in each of these
solutions, and each solution's effectiveness will be hindered with-
out involvement at the EU level. The EU will surely benefit
from increased trans-national involvement as it attempts to reach
its stated goals of a trans-European network and a common mar-
ket. The EU must clearly state its plan of congestion manage-
ment and take an active role, if it wishes to achieve an efficient,
profitable system.
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